Children’s sociomoral judgements of antisocial but not prosocial others depend on recipients’ past moral behaviour

This study investigated whether recipients’ past moral or immoral behaviour shapes 4-year-olds’ judgements of the agents who either harm or help the recipients. Children (N = 161) watched the agent who either harmed or helped the antisocial, prosocial or neutral recipient. Afterwards, children indicated their sociomoral judgement of the agent’s act, their attitude towards the agent and their perception of the agent’s emotions. Children liked the agent more, ascribed less sadness to the agent, and judged the agent’s actions as less bad when the agent inflicted harm against the antisocial recipient than on the prosocial and neutral recipient. The recipient’s past behaviour did not influence children’s evaluations when the agent helped the recipient. The presented evidence indicates that by the age of 4, children develop the ability to use complex moral reasoning that allows them to monitor whether the harmful behaviour of antisocial others is justified by retaliation for past transgressions

Egocentrism shapes moral judgements

We review past and recent literature on how egocentrism shapes moral judgements. We focus on mechanisms by which egocentric evaluations appear to people as objective, impartial and morally right. We also show that people seem to be unaware of these biases and suggest that understanding how egocentrism impacts moral judgements demands studying morality embedded in a specific social context rather than the social void created in a laboratory. Finally, we argue that egocentric biases in moral judgements are not easily overcome and persist even if people deliberately try to omit attitudes in their judgements or if morally relevant information is present. We conclude thategocentric evaluations triggered by such factors as personal and group interests or attitudes may lay at the core of moral judgements of others because they help maintain a strategic social and personal relationships

Jak postępować z chorymi niewyrażającymi zgody na leczenie? Opis przypadku i przegląd aktów prawnych związanych z autonomią pacjenta w Polsce

Every patient, both in public and private healthcare institutions, has the right to maintain their own autonomy. This is one of the basic patient rights as well as one of the basic human rights, meaning that the patient cannot undergo treatment which is against his or her will. The patient has the full right to make independent decisions concerning his or her own life and health. Violation of the patient’s rights of autonomy by a doctor or another member of medical personnel may result in sanctions as described in article 448 of the Civil Code. The following publication describes the case of a female patient who refused consent to surgical intervention, and died shortly thereafter. The legal aspects concerning patient autonomy in Poland are also reviewed. Acta Angiol 2011; 17, 1: 109–116Każdy pacjent przebywający zarówno w publicznym, jak i niepublicznym zakładzie opieki zdrowotnej ma prawo do zachowania swojej autonomii. Prawo do autonomii jest jednym z podstawowych praw każdego chorego, jak również jednym z podstawowych praw człowieka. Dzięki niemu leczenie pacjentów nie może się odbywać wbrew ich woli. Chory ma pełne prawo samodecydowania o swoim życiu i zdrowiu. Za naruszenie prawa do autonomii lekarzowi lub innej osobie z personelu medycznego grożą sankcje zapisane w artykule 448 kodeksu cywilnego. W niniejszym artykule opisano przypadek chorej, która nie wyraziła zgody na leczenie operacyjne i zmarła. Przedstawiono również prawne aspekty związane z autonomią pacjenta w Polsce. Acta Angiol 2011; 17, 1: 109–11

Moral tribalism: Moral judgments of actions supporting ingroup interests depend on collective narcissism

In this article, we examine how group identity and protection of group interests shape morality judgments. We argue that actions serving ingroup interests are more likely to be judged as moral (or less immoral) than the same actions that do not serve ingroup interests. However, this group-interest bias should be especially strong among those high in collective narcissism—a defensive belief in ingroup greatness that is not appreciated by others. In Studies 1 (N = 185, Polish and British participants) and 2 (N = 404, British participants), participants judged actions favouring interests of outgroup members as less moral than similar actions favouring interests of their ingroup. However, this effect was only present for those high in national collective narcissism. In Study 3 (N = 400, American participants), moral judgments of the US Senate's decision about Brett Kavanaugh's nomination depended on partisanship, but this effect was strengthened by partisan collective narcissism. Finally, in Study 4 (N = 711, American participants), the association between national collective narcissism and morality judgments of President Trump's decision to remain an ally of Saudi Arabia was especially strong when national interest was salient (vs. not). None of the studies observed similar moderating effects of conventional ingroup identification. Overall, these results suggest that ingroup interests shape moral judgments, but this bias is most prevalent among those who are defensive about their group identity

Moral conformity in a digital world: Human and nonhuman agents as a source of social pressure for judgments of moral character

Could judgments about others’ moral character be changed under group pressure produced by human and virtual agents? In Study 1 (N = 103), participants first judged targets’ moral character privately and two weeks later in the presence of real humans. Analysis of how many times participants changed their private moral judgments under group pressure showed that moral conformity occurred, on average, 43% of the time. In Study 2 (N = 138), we extended this using Virtual Reality, where group pressure was produced either by avatars allegedly controlled by humans or AI. While replicating the effect of moral conformity (at 28% of the time), we find that the moral conformity for the human and AI-controlled avatars did not differ. Our results suggest that human and nonhuman groups shape moral character judgments in both the physical and virtual worlds, shedding new light on the potential social consequences of moral conformity in the modern digital world

Leczenie chorego z pękniętym tętniakiem aorty brzusznej i z nieoperacyjnym rakiem jelita grubego - opis przypadku i przegląd piśmiennictwa

Jednoczasowe występowanie u pacjenta choroby nowotworowej i pękniętego tętniaka aorty brzusznej w praktyce klinicznej występuje rzadko. Ze względu na coraz większą liczbę zachorowań na nowotwory, coraz lepsze i bardziej wyrafinowane badania diagnostyczne, a także wzrost w populacji liczby osób powyżej 65. roku życia, lekarze coraz częściej w swojej praktyce będą spotykać się z pacjentami, u których jednoczasowo występuje tętniak aorty brzusznej i choroba nowotworowa. Leczenie takich chorych wciąż budzi duże kontrowersje. W niniejszej pracy przedstawiono przypadek leczenia chorego z pękniętym tętniakiem aorty brzusznej i nieoperacyjnym rakiem jelita grubego. Poruszono także problematykę etyczną i prawną związaną z postępowaniem lekarza w takich przypadkach.It is very unusual to encounter in clinical practice a simultaneous neoplasm and a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm in one patient. Because of the growing number of patients suffering from neoplasms, better and more precise diagnostic procedures, and a growing population of people over 65 years old, doctors will, more often than not, meet patients with simultaneous abdominal aortic aneurysm and neoplasm disease. The treatment of such cases gives rise to a great deal of controversy. In this paper, the treatment of a patient with a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm and with unoperative colon carcinoma is presented together with the ethical and legal problems related to medical procedures in such cases

“Not Racist, But...”: Beliefs About Immigration Restrictions, Collective Narcissism, and Justification of Ethnic Extremism

Surveys conducted across multiple countries show that most people view seeking lower immigration to help maintain the majority group's population share as a sign of racial self-interest—as opposed to racism. We investigated whether the belief that it is not racist to want immigration restrictions for cultural reasons is associated with ingroup identification (a positive attachment to and solidarity with one's group) or collective narcissism (a conviction that the ingroup is exceptional and deserves special treatment). We argue that if this belief reflects concern for the ingroup, it should be linked to ingroup identification. However, if it is a defensive justification of the ingroup's privileged position, it should be linked to collective narcissism. Across four studies, national (Study 1: United Kingdom, N = 46

Partner in Crime: Beneficial Cooperation Overcomes Children’s Aversion to Antisocial Others

Young children display strong aversion toward antisocial individuals, but also feel responsible for joint activities and express a strong sense of group loyalty. This paper aims to understand how beneficial cooperation with an antisocial partner shapes preschoolers’ attitudes, preferences and moral judgments concerning antisocial individuals. We argue that although young children display a strong aversion to antisocial characters, children may overcome this aversion when they stand to personally benefit. In Study 1a (N = 62), beneficial cooperation with an antisocial partner resulted in the children’s later preference for the antisocial partner over the neutral partner. Study 1b (N = 91) replicated this effect with discrete measurement of liking (resource distribution) and showed that children rewarded more and punished less the antisocial partner in the beneficial cooperation setting. In Study 2, (N = 58), children’s aversion to an antisocial ingroup member decreased when the cooperation benefited other ingroup members. Finally, in Study 3 (N = 62), when children passively observed the antisocial individual, personal benefits from the antisocial behavior did not change their negative attitude toward the antisocial individual. Overall, beneficial cooperation with the antisocial partner increased the children’s liking and preference for the antisocial partner, but did not affect the children’s moral judgments. Presented evidence suggests that by the age of 4, children develop a strong obligation to collaborate with partners who help them to acquire resources – even when these partners harm third parties, which children recognize as immoral

Investigating variation in replicability

Although replication is a central tenet of science, direct replications are rare in psychology. This research tested variation in the replicability of 13 classic and contemporary effects across 36 independent samples totaling 6,344 participants. In the aggregate, 10 effects replicated consistently. One effect – imagined contact reducing prejudice – showed weak support for replicability. And two effects – flag priming influencing conservatism and currency priming influencing system justification – did not replicate. We compared whether the conditions such as lab versus online or US versus international sample predicted effect magnitudes. By and large they did not. The results of this small sample of effects suggest that replicability is more dependent on the effect itself than on the sample and setting used to investigate the effect